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1  Introduction 
 
As the guardian of the constitution, the high court from time to time disappoints the 
ambitions of legislators and governments. This is part of our system of checks and 
balances. People who exercise political power, and claim to represent the will of the 
people, do not like being checked or balanced.2 
 
Towards the end of 2011 a public controversy erupted in South Africa when it was 
announced that the government intended to conduct an assessment of the decisions 
of the South African Constitutional Court. The proposal was later amended to include 
the Supreme Court of Appeal, as well as the Constitutional Court. At the time of 
writing this article, the precise nature of the review to be conducted is not entirely 
clear. What is clear, however, is the deep sense of unease being experienced by 
South African lawyers and academics at the prospect of a possible clash between 
the executive and the judiciary on an issue which goes to the heart of South Africa's 
post-apartheid constitutional democracy. That issue is the nature and extent of the 
powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the legislature and the executive, which concerns 
the doctrine of the separation of powers. It is not difficult to understand the depth of 
the unease being experienced at present. After all, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that the key role players within South Africa's democracy lack a common 
                                                          
1  The phrase 'Vox Populi? Vox Humbug!' used in the title of this article is borrowed from William 
Tecumseh Sherman, the American Civil War general who used it in relation to press reporting. It 
is adapted from the ancient adage 'Vox populi, vox Dei' - 'The voice of the people [is] the voice of 
God', the origins of which are uncertain. However, an early example of its use was by Alcuin in 
798 AD (Wikiquotes Date Unknown en.wikipedia.org).  
*  David Hulme. BA, LLB, LLM (UKZN). Senior Lecturer of Law, School of Law, Howard College 
Campus, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Attorney of the High Court of South Africa.  Email:  
hulmed@ukzn.ac.za. 
**  Stephen Peté. BA, LLB (UKZN), LLM (UCT), M Phil (University of Cambridge). Associate 
Professor, School of Law, Howard College Campus, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Attorney of the 
High Court of South Africa.  Email: pete@ukzn.ac.za. 
2  Former Chief Justice of Australia, Murray Gleeson, as quoted by former Chief Justice of South 
Africa, Arthur Chaskalson (Chaskalson 2012 www.timeslive.co.za). 
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understanding of the implications of the key doctrine of the separation of powers, 
which spells rough weather ahead for constitutional democracy in the country.  
 
In Part One of this article the continuing furore around the South African 
government's proposal to review the performance of the judiciary will be discussed 
and analysed. The looming clash between the South African executive and judiciary 
will then be compared to a similar clash which took place in 17th century England, at 
a time when the doctrine of the separation of powers - in what may be termed its 
'modern' sense at least - was in its infancy. Although far removed from present-day 
South Africa in both space and time, the clash between the executive, represented 
by King James I, and the judiciary, represented by Chief Justice Edward Coke, in 
17th century England, serves to illustrate that the rising tensions between the South 
African executive and judiciary over the separation of powers are by no means 
unusual. In fact, such clashes appear to be fairly common, particularly in young 
democracies in which democratic institutions are yet to be properly consolidated. 
Furthermore, the English example illustrates the serious consequences which may 
flow from such a clash. The clash between the executive and the judiciary in England 
is indicative of the ideological gulf which existed at the time between the Stuart 
monarchs and the other organs of governance. This was to cause the country to 
descend into a brutal civil war, followed by a military dictatorship. This lamentable 
outcome lends a degree of urgency to the lessons which may be learned by 
examining the current tensions in South Africa through this particular legal and 
historical lens.  
 
In Part Two of this article attention will be focused on two specific cases which arose 
out of the clash between James and Coke - Prohibitions Del Roy and The Case of 
Proclamations. The article will then turn to a discussion of the lessons which can be 
drawn from these cases. The respective arguments which were raised in the cases 
will be contrasted and compared with more contemporary arguments raised in the 
context of the present looming conflict between the South African executive and 
judiciary. The views of Ronald Dworkin, a leading exponent of the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, will be closely examined in this section of the article. Dworkin's 
arguments against 'majoritarian' conceptions of democracy will be discussed in 
particular detail, together with the implications of these arguments for the central 
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issues under the spotlight in this article. Tentative conclusions will then be drawn and 
warnings issued of the negative consequences for South Africa if the potential 
conflict between the executive and the judiciary is not properly resolved. 
 
2  Rising tensions – the origins of the controversy between the South 
African executive and the judiciary  
 
On 24 November 2011 the cabinet of South African President Jacob Zuma released 
a statement which included the following sub-heading: 'Assessment on the 
transformation of the judicial system and the role of the judiciary in a developmental 
state to be carried out with a reputable research institution.'3 Under this sub-heading 
it was announced, inter alia, that the Cabinet had:4 
 
…agreed to the following approach to the transformation of the judicial system: That 
the assessment of the decisions of the Constitutional Court be undertaken by a 
research institution to establish how the decisions of the court have impacted on the 
lives of ordinary citizens and how these decisions have influenced socio-economic 
transformation and the reform of the law.  
 
The fact that an 'assessment of the decisions of the Constitutional Court' had been 
decided upon by the cabinet set alarm bells ringing.5 This was the start of a public 
controversy which was to endure and increase in intensity for many months following 
the announcement.6 
 
An important factor to be taken into account in assessing the rising tension between 
the executive and the judiciary is the fact that the government had lost a number of 
                                                          
3  GCIS 2011 www.info.gov.za. 
4  GCIS 2011 www.info.gov.za. 
5  Early reaction from members of civil society within South Africa was characterised by deep 
concern. For example, the civil society organisation Council for the Advancement of the South 
African Constitution (CASAC) released a statement which read, inter alia: "While we should not 
shy away from any credible and non-partisan evaluation of the social and economic trajectory of 
the country since 1994, any notion that the executive has the right to review or oversee the 
jurisprudential performance of the courts and especially the Constitutional Court – which is the 
ultimate guardian of the Constitution – should be strongly resisted. Otherwise we would be 
inverting the principle that South Africa is a constitutional democracy rather than a parliamentary 
democracy – a principle that was at the forefront of the struggle for liberation and one which 
guided the Constitutional Assembly in its tasks … Any attempts to diagnose the Constitution and 
the Constitutional Court as the 'scapegoat' for the shortcomings of the transformation of South 
African society should also be opposed. Such endeavours would be mischievous and self-
serving." (CASAC 2011 www.casac.org.za). 
6  At the time of writing, the controversy still shows no sign of abating. 
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high profile and politically sensitive court cases in the months leading up to the 
controversy. Among these may be counted the politically highly sensitive case of 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma.7 In this matter the Supreme Court 
of Appeal decided to overturn a decision of the High Court not to allow the 
prosecution of Jacob Zuma on charges of corruption related to South Africa's 
notorious multi-billion rand 'arms deal'.8 Although this case ostensibly had nothing to 
do with the executive itself - since it involved Jacob Zuma in his personal capacity - it 
is clear that legally opening the way to a potential future prosecution of the current 
president of South Africa is unlikely to have endeared the Supreme Court of Appeal 
or the judiciary as a whole to the present executive. 
 
Another case which seems to have led to increased tension between the executive 
and judiciary, and which is linked to the above saga, revolved around a decision 
taken on 6 April 2009 by the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions, Mokotedi 
Mpshe, not to prosecute the charges of corruption against Jacob Zuma. Mpshe’s 
decision cleared the way for Zuma to be elected president by the National Assembly 
after the 2009 election.9 The decision not to prosecute led to legal action on the part 
of the Democratic Alliance against the National Prosecuting Authority. As a 
preliminary step to challenging the decision itself, the Democratic Alliance brought an 
application to obtain the records on which the National Prosecuting Authority had 
based its decision not to prosecute Zuma. The application was rejected in the North 
Gauteng High Court, but this judgment of the High Court was overturned by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in March 2012.10 Jackson Mthembu, the African National 
Congress National Spokesperson, characterised the Democratic Alliance's approach 
to the courts as a 'continued attempt by the DA to use the Courts to undermine and 
                                                          
7  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 (SCA). 
8  What is today commonly referred to by South Africans as 'The Arms Deal' was a complex series 
of contracts, finalised in 1999, for the purchase of weaponry to the value of around R30 billion. 
The decision which the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned was that of Nicholson J in Zuma v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 1 All SA 54 (N). In that case, Nicholson J had set 
aside a decision by the National Director of Public Prosecutions to indict President Zuma on 
charges of corruption related to the arms deal.  
9  For comment see Maluleke 2009 www.unisa.ac.za. 
10  Democratic Alliance v The Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions (288/11) 2012 ZASCA 
15 (20 March 2012). Ironically, the Supreme Court of Appeal in this case took the court a quo to 
task, inter alia for failing to limit itself to the judicial sphere, failing to take into account only the 
issues that are before it, and transgressing the boundaries between the judicial, executive and 
legislative functions (see paras [15] and [16] at 287I-288D). 
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paralyse government.'11 Clearly, cases such as this could not but help heighten 
tensions between the executive and the judiciary. 
 
Yet another recent high-profile court judgment which seems to have contributed to 
rising tension between the executive and the judiciary is the well-known Glenister 
case, in which a businessman by the name of Hugh Glenister launched a successful 
Constitutional Court challenge questioning the independence of the elite crime-
fighting unit known as 'The Hawks'.12 This unit had been set up to replace a former 
elite crime-fighting unit known as 'The Scorpions', which had been disbanded in 
2008 amid much public controversy.13 The reason for the controversy surrounding 
the demise of the Scorpions was a fairly widespread belief that the unit had been 
disbanded in order to protect corrupt members of the political elite.14 The unit had 
been involved in a number of high-profile criminal investigations into the activities of 
high-ranking politicians and their associates, as well as the subsequent prosecution 
of these individuals. For example, the unit was involved in investigating Jackie 
Selebi, the National Commissioner of Police and the President of Interpol, on 
charges of corruption - leading to his eventual conviction and sentence to a term of 
15 years' imprisonment. The unit had also played a role in the investigation and 
successful prosecution of both Tony Yengeni (a former Parliamentary Chief Whip of 
the African National Congress) and Schabir Shaik (a businessman with close links to 
Jacob Zuma, current president of South Africa) on charges of corruption related to 
                                                          
11  Mthembu stated, inter alia, as follows: "[W]e … want to highlight the following: [1] The continued 
attempt by the DA to use the Courts to undermine and paralyse government. [2] The granting of 
blanket permission to political parties to review any State decisions, using Courts. [3] How the 
DA will conduct a review of the case when it can't have access to all the information which 
informed the NDPP's decision to withdraw the charges … Given these facts, it is clear that 
democracy can be undermined by simply approaching courts to reverse any decision arrived at 
by a qualified organ of State … The ANC is of the view that this matter should not go 
unchallenged as it might have huge implications for effective governance, including current and 
future decisions of any organ of State." (statement issued on 20th March 2012, by Jackson 
Mthembu, ANC National Spokesperson: Mthembu 2012 www.politicsweb.co.za). 
12   See Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC). 
13  The official name of ‘The Scorpions’ was the Directorate of Special Operations. It was a multi-
disciplinary agency which fell under the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), and was set up to 
investigate and prosecute organised crime and corruption. It came into operation on 12 January 
2001 and ceased to operate on 23 October 2008. 
14  See for instance Anon 2008a www.bdlive.co.za; Anon 2008b www.bdlive.co.za; Zille 2008 
www.da.org.za; Hoffman 2009 www.bdlive.co.za; Anon 2011 www.bdlive.co.za; Zille 2010 
www.da.org.za. 
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South Africa's notorious multi-billion rand arms deal referred to above.15 
Furthermore, the unit was involved in investigating the charges of corruption - 
referred to earlier in this article - against Jacob Zuma himself. Indeed, the unit had 
conducted raids on Zuma's Johannesburg residence, as well as on the offices of his 
attorney in Durban, to search for evidence.16 As said previously, the charges of 
corruption were dropped before Zuma was sworn in as president.17 After the 
Scorpions had been disbanded and replaced by the Hawks the investigation that the 
Scorpions had been conducting into allegations of corruption connected to the arms 
deal was effectively closed.18 Without commenting on the validity or otherwise of the 
allegations and counter-allegations surrounding the disbanding of the Scorpions and 
the establishment of the Hawks, it seems clear that the judgment delivered by the 
Constitutional Court in the Glenister case would have been disappointing to both the 
president and his political allies. 
 
A final high-profile court judgment which may be mentioned as possibly contributing 
to the rising tension between the executive and the judiciary is that concerning the 
appointment by President Jacob Zuma of Advocate Menzies Similane as National 
Director of Public Prosecutions. On 1 December 2011 a panel of five judges of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal declared this appointment to be unlawful. It would be 
surprising if this judgment was not of concern to both the president and the rest of 
the executive. Both the high-profile nature of the appointment and the politics 
surrounding it would have added to the resentment and, perhaps, a growing sense 
that the courts were setting themselves up as an alternative centre of power by 
'interfering' in this way. 
 
An indication of the rising tension between the executive and the judiciary is to be 
found in various pronouncements of high-profile political figures within the executive. 
For example, on 1 September 2011, Ngoako Ramatlhodi, a member of the National 
Executive Committee of the African National Congress, the chairperson of the 
National Elections' Committee of the party, and the Deputy Minister of Correctional 
                                                          
15  See S v Shaik 2007 1 SACR 142; S v Shaik 2007 1 SA 240 (SCA); S v Shaik 2008 2 SA 208 
(CC). 
16  See Sapa 2005 www.iol.co.za. 
17  Although, following the case of National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 2 SA 277 
(SCA), such charges may be reinstated at some point in the future. 
18  See Staff Reporter 2010 www.mg.co.za; Ensor 2009 www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za. 
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Services, launched an attack on South Africa's democratic Constitution. Adopting a 
rather crude instrumentalist neo-Marxist analysis, he claimed that the liberation 
movement had 'made fatal concessions' during the negotiations which had ended 
apartheid.19 In his view this had resulted in a constitution which reflected 'a 
compromise tilted heavily in favour of forces against change.'20 He clearly viewed the 
Constitution as a poisoned chalice deliberately designed to keep real power away 
from South Africa's black majority: 21 
 
Apartheid forces sought to and succeeded in retaining white domination under a 
black government. This they achieved by emptying the legislature and executive of 
real political power ... [T]he black majority enjoys empty political power while forces 
against change reign supreme in the economy, judiciary, public opinion and civil 
society ... The old order has built a fortified front line in the mentioned forums. Given 
massive resources deriving from ownership of the economy, forces against change 
are able to finance their programmes and projects aimed at defending the status 
quo. As a result, formal political rights conferred on blacks can be exercised only 
within the parameters of the old apartheid economic relations ... This imbalance is 
reflected across the length and breadth of the country in economic, social and even 
political terms to some extent ... The objective of protecting white economic 
interests, having been achieved with the adoption of the new Constitution, a grand 
and total strategy to entrench it for all times, was rolled out. In this regard, power 
was systematically taken out of the legislature and the executive to curtail efforts 
and initiatives aimed at inducing fundamental changes. In this way, elections would 
be regular rituals handing empty victories to the ruling party. 
 
Just over nine months later Ramatlhodi followed up his attack in a memorial lecture 
which he delivered in honour of the late African National Congress President AB 
Xuma. Thabo Mokone of Times Live reported on this lecture, inter alia, as follows: 22 
                                                          
19  Ramatlhodi 2011 www.timeslive.co.za. 
20  Ramatlhodi 2011 www.timeslive.co.za. 
21  Ramatlhodi 2011 www.timeslive.co.za. As was to be expected, Ramatlhodi's views met with stiff 
opposition. For example, on 1 September 2011 in a blog entitled 'Why Ramatlhodi promotes an 
autocratic kleptocracy', legal academic and constitutional law commentator Professor Pierre de 
Vos responded, inter alia, as follows: 'Mr Ramatlhodi probably knows that the credibility of the 
ANC and the government it leads is being eroded by lavish and wasteful spending on the perks 
of party leaders and by the constant revelations of government corruption in our media and by 
the Public Protector … It is therefore not surprising that he is now using the South African 
Constitution and our independent constitutional institutions as scapegoats to try and divert 
attention from the failures of the government. Our government is failing to address the most basic 
needs of the poor while government and party leaders live lavish lifestyles at the expense of 
taxpayers and of the poor … These views are not only uninformed and demonstrably wrong; they 
are also callous and dangerous. Blaming the Constitution, the courts and chapter 9 institutions 
for the failures of the government sufficiently to change the lives of ordinary citizens who suffered 
under apartheid is like a man blaming an umbrella for making him wet or a white South African 
blaming black citizens for apartheid …' See De Vos 2011 constitutionallyspeaking.co.za. 
22  Mokone 2012 m.thetimes.co.za. Not surprisingly, once again Ramatlhodi's comments elicited 
strong opposition. Dene Smuts, the Democratic Alliance Shadow Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, issued a statement on 7 June 2012, in which she stated, inter alia: 
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ANC national executive committee member Ngoako Ramatlhodi has launched a 
fresh attack on the judiciary, saying it was being used by a 'minority tyranny' out to 
undermine the executive ... 'I have seen now in our country the courts are being 
used to replace the executive ... There is a tyranny, a minority tyranny, that is using 
state institutions to undermine democratic processes at this juncture in our country,' 
he said in reference to court outcomes that did not favour the government. 
 
The forthright and somewhat crude nature of Ramatlhodi's attacks on the judiciary 
and the Constitution are particularly interesting in that they reveal at least one 
(although not perhaps the only) strand of thinking on the broad issue of the 
separation of powers within the executive at this time.  
 
Another indication of the executive's general attitude towards the judiciary and the 
Constitution is to be found in the views of President Jacob Zuma himself. On 1 
November 2011, for example, the president delivered an address to a joint sitting of 
parliament to bid farewell to former Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo and to welcome 
the new Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng. While affirming his belief in the principles 
of the rule of law, the separation of powers and judicial independence, President 
Zuma stated that there was 'a need to distinguish the areas of responsibility, 
between the judiciary and the elected branches of the State, especially with regards 
(sic) to policy formulation.'23 Significantly, he then went on pointedly to make the 
following statement: 24 
 
Our view is that the Executive, as elected officials, has the sole discretion to decide 
policies for government ... We respect the powers and role conferred by our 
Constitution on the legislature and the judiciary. At the same time, we expect the 
same from these very important institutions of our democratic dispensation. The 
Executive must be allowed to conduct its administration and policy making work as 
freely as it possibly can. The powers conferred on the courts cannot be regarded as 
superior to the powers resulting from a mandate given by the people in a popular 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
'Adv Ngoako Ramatlhodi, in his latest attack on the judiciary, is descending to dirty tactics ... His 
remarks are framed as an attack on a political party but in fact he attacks the impartiality of the 
judges, suggesting they are partisan and thereby discrediting them. He calls the DA the leader of 
a "new tyranny". Higher Education Minister Blade Nzimande recently said much the same thing, 
accusing the print media of conducting a huge liberal offensive against our democracy. The clear 
implication was that the press is in cahoots with the DA ... Both Ramatlhodi and Nzimande are 
democratic centralists and therefore believe in the tyranny of the majority: every institution must 
be controlled by the one party which runs the state. It is therefore unthinkable to them that the 
courts or the press should be able to rule or write against the government ... The courts are 
under a constitutionally imposed duty to review executive action for such reasonableness. And 
the DA has a duty to take irrational decisions on review whenever it is in a position to do so.' 
(Smuts 2012 www.politicsweb.co.za). 
23  Zuma 2011 www.info.gov.za. 
24  Zuma 2011 www.info.gov.za. 
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vote. We also reiterate that in order to provide support to the judiciary and free our 
courts to do their work, it would help if political disputes were resolved politically. 
We must not get a sense that there are those who wish to co-govern the country 
through the courts, when they have not won the popular vote during elections.  
 
As the tension rose, prominent figures within the legal system began to speak out. 
For example, on 9 December 2011, Advocate George Bizos SC delivered an 
address on being presented with an honorary doctorate by the University of Pretoria, 
which was entitled 'Blame neither the Constitution nor the Courts'.25 He began by 
pointing out that there had been many criticisms levelled against the Constitution and 
the courts, most of which, in his view, were 'unfair, unjustified and uninformed'.26 He 
quoted a range of examples in which high-ranking members of the ruling party had 
complained about the attitude of the judiciary, including the Secretary-General of the 
African National Congress, Mr Gwede Mantashe, who had been quoted as saying 
that the judiciary was 'consolidating opposition to government' and that there was 'a 
great deal of hostility that came through from the judiciary towards the Executive and 
Parliament', and that 'judges were reversing the gains of transformation through 
precedents'.27 He pointed, inter alia, to a speech delivered on 8 July 2011 by 
President Zuma during the Third Annual Access to Justice Conference in Pretoria. In 
that speech, the president had stated that: 28 
 
Political disputes resulting from the exercise of powers that have been 
constitutionally conferred on the ruling party through a popular vote must not be 
subverted, simply because those who disagree with the ruling party politically, and 
who cannot win the popular vote during elections, feel [that] other arms of the State 
are avenues to help them co-govern the country. 
 
In support of his view that the extensive criticism on the part of members of the 
executive against the judiciary and the Constitution was unfair, unjustified and 
uninformed, Bizos cited two examples from South African legal history, in which the 
executive and judiciary had clashed over the question of the separation of powers. 
The first example was the 1897 case of Brown v Leyds, in which Chief Justice Kotz 
of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek clashed with Paul Kruger, the president of that 
                                                          
25  George Bizos had, of course, famously defended Nelson Mandela at his treason trial in the 
1960s. 
26  Bizos "Public Address". 
27  Bizos "Public Address". 
28  Bizos "Public Address". 
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Republic, over the so-called 'right of testing' of the courts.29 The second example 
cited by Bizos was the notorious 1951 case of Harris v Minister of the Interior, in 
which the Appellate Division clashed with a racist National Party government intent 
on disenfranchising so called 'coloured' voters in the Cape.30 Both these battles 
resulted in eventual defeat for the judiciary at the hands of the executive, and Bizos 
expressed the hope that 'our current ruling party does not intend to follow either the 
[apartheid] regime's example or that of President Kruger.'31  
 
In words that indicate clearly the alarming size of the rift developing between the 
executive and the judiciary, Bizos expressed deep concern at the fact that: 'The 
courts, as well as the individuals and organizations that bring human rights cases 
against the executive, to whom some impute false motives, have been subject to 
severe criticisms bordering on demonization.'32 He bemoaned the fact that certain of 
President Nelson Mandela's successors in government had not followed the first 
democratic president's example of deep respect for the decisions of South Africa's 
Constitutional Court. He pointed out that: 'Many current government office holders 
have spoken out against the Courts role in ensuring that the government acts 
consistently with the Constitution.'33 Referring to the Similane case discussed 
previously, Bizos argued that the decision in that case 'serves as a reminder to the 
President that he is not above the law'.34 Significantly for the purposes of this article, 
he then went on to comment on the proposed 'assessment' of the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court, which had been announced by the cabinet: 35 
 
There is no reason to establish a new oversight body not provided for in the 
Constitution. Nobody likes losing cases but this idea of assessing the decisions of 
the Constitutional Court, or any other court for that matter, is neither prudent nor 
                                                          
29  Kotze was eventually dismissed by Kruger in a demonstration of executive power. Dugard notes 
poignantly that: 'The final word on the judicial crisis belongs to President Kruger. At the swearing-
in ceremony of the new Chief Justice, R. Gregorowski, he enunciated a biblical-trekker legal 
philosophy which still haunts the minds of South African judges and lawyers. The testing right is 
a principle of the Devil, he warned. The Devil had introduced the testing right into Paradise and 
tested God's word. Judges accordingly were advised not to follow the Devil's way, as Kotze C.J. 
had done!' (Dugard Human Rights 24). 
30  Once again, although the judiciary won a few battles, it was the executive which won the war, 
and the 'coloured' voters in the Cape were eventually removed from the voters roll. 
31  Bizos "Public Address". 
32  Bizos "Public Address". 
33  Bizos "Public Address". 
34  Bizos "Public Address". 
35  Bizos "Public Address". 
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wise. Any such assessment body would take the people of South Africa down a 
road that is unconstitutional, unreasonable, unsustainable, and that must be 
construed as nothing less than a resurgence of the methods of the apartheid 
regime. How ironic that the very party that fought so hard against apartheid is now 
considering adopting one of the regimes most devious methods. The idea of 
assessing the courts is completely contradictory to the spirit, purpose and object of 
the Constitution and to the legacy of Nelson Mandela. 
 
The dawn of a new year was to see the above controversy develop into a full-blown 
furore.36 
 
3  The controversy deepens  
 
In late January 2012 former South African Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson delivered 
a speech at a workshop held at the University of Cape Town in which he commented 
on the growing anger of politicians directed against the Constitution. He pointed out 
that a degree of tension between politicians and judges was inevitable in a 
constitutional democracy characterised by the rule of law with an independent 
judiciary tasked with the judicial review of legislative and executive action. According 
to Chaskalson such tension was inherent in all systems which respected the doctrine 
of the separation of powers. Significantly for the purposes of this article, he then 
alluded to the possible reasons for the rising sense of frustration among the 
executive, as well as the negative consequences for the country as a whole: 37 
 
The executive has no doubt been frustrated by a number of high-profile cases that it 
has lost before the courts, and this may be the reason for complaints by political 
leaders about the judiciary. Unsuccessful litigants are inclined to blame the court 
rather than themselves and politicians are no exception to this ... Such attacks, 
coming from senior politicians, undermine the constitutional order and pose a threat 
to our democracy. 
 
Chaskalson went on to dispute the argument being raised with increasing frequency 
by members of the ruling elite that the Constitution was an obstacle to the 
transformation of South African society - away from the inequalities of apartheid. 
Referring to the 'canard raised by critics that the Constitution is a bar to 
transformation', Chaskalson pointed out that the Constitution contained an 
unequivocal commitment to the transformation of South African society, in that: 'It 
                                                          
36  This will be discussed in detail in the next section of this article. 
37  Chaskalson 2012 www.timeslive.co.za. 
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calls for positive action to confront the apartheid legacy of poverty and dis-
empowerment, and for building a truly nonracial society committed to social 
justice.'38 He then disputed arguments that the South African judiciary was 
'untransformed'39 and cited extracts from a string of Constitutional Court decisions, 
which clearly demonstrated a deep commitment on the part of the Court to the 
fundamental transformation of South African society at all levels, so as to reflect 'a 
democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian ethos' - in the words 
of Justice Ismail Mahomed.40 He concluded that any lack of transformation within 
South African society could not be laid at the door of the courts, and ended with the 
following stinging rebuke of those within the ruling party who blamed the Constitution 
for a lack of transformation: 41 
 
The preamble and the founding values of the Constitution assert human dignity, the 
achievement of equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
These were not values forced on those who negotiated the Constitution on behalf of 
the ANC; nor was an entrenched Bill of Rights. They were demands made by the 
ANC which had been enshrined in the Harare Declaration of 1989. Do those who 
blame the Constitution for lack of transformation want a legal order in which human 
rights are not entrenched, and parliament is supreme, where, as a former South 
African chief justice of those times observed in 1934: 'Parliament may make any 
encroachment it chooses upon the life, liberty, or property of any individual subject 
to its sway ... and it is the function of the courts of law to enforce its will.' If this is 
what they want, they should say so.  
  
In February 2012 fuel was added to the fire already burning on the issue of the 
proposed assessment of the decisions of the Constitutional Court. During an 
interview with The Star newspaper on 13 February, President Jacob Zuma confirmed 
that he saw a need to 'review the Constitutional Court's powers.'42 He was also 
reported to have stated that the matter was 'a general societal issue that is being 
raised', and that it was a 'growing view' (presumably within South African society at 
large).43 Significantly, he was also alleged to have stated that the judges were 
'influenced by what's happening and influenced by you guys (the media)', and was 
                                                          
38  Chaskalson 2012 www.timeslive.co.za. 
39  Chaskalson pointed out that comparatively few judges from the apartheid era still held office, and 
that about 60 percent of the judiciary were black, including the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief 
Justice, the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Deputy President of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, and all of the judges president of the high court, as well as eight of the eleven 
Constitutional Court justices. See Chaskalson 2012 www.timeslive.co.za. 
40  Chaskalson 2012 www.timeslive.co.za. 
41  Chaskalson 2012 www.timeslive.co.za. 
42  Monare 2012 www.iol.co.za. 
43  Monare 2012 www.iol.co.za. 
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reported to have expressed the following specific concerns about the manner in 
which Constitutional Court judgments are reached: 44 
 
We don't want to review the Constitutional Court, we want to review its powers. It is 
after experience that some of the decisions are not decisions that every other judge 
in the Constitutional Court agrees with ... There are dissenting judgments which we 
read. You will find that the dissenting one has more logic than the one that enjoyed 
the majority. What do you do in that case? That's what has made the issue to 
become the issue of concern.  
 
These somewhat confusing remarks were clarified when The Presidency released a 
statement to the media on the same day they were made, which read, inter alia, as 
follows: 45 
 
The President's comments must be viewed in the context of the decision of Cabinet 
of November 2011, in terms of which the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development has been directed to conduct an assessment of the impact of the 
judgments of the Constitutional Court on the transformation of society in the 17 
years of democracy ... The exercise is with a view to assess the transformative 
nature of jurisprudence from the highest court in the land in promoting an equal, 
non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society envisioned by the Constitution within 
the context of a developmental state. This exercise is not unusual, but occurs all the 
time ... Often scholars and writers give their own perspectives on decisions of the 
courts and court decisions are not immune from public scrutiny provided of course 
that this is done within permissible limits. This must therefore not be viewed as an 
attempt by government to undermine the independence of the judiciary and the rule 
of law which are entrenched in our Constitution. This is an exercise that falls within 
the mandate of the Executive of formulating and reviewing policies of government 
which seek to advance the transformative character of our Constitution. 
 
Predictably, reaction to the proposed 'review' was negative. For example, a 
spokesperson for the Democratic Alliance called on the president to clarify his 
remarks, stating that: 'President Zuma will find that he is on the path to a full-blown 
confrontation with the Constitutional Court if his remarks really mean what they seem 
to mean, because the court itself decides the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments'.46 The spokesperson further expressed concern that at the root of the 
president's desire for a review of the powers of the Constitutional Court lay his 
irritation with previous judgments of the Court. A spokesperson for the Black 
Lawyers Association was reported to have said that the president's decision to 
                                                          
44  Monare 2012 www.iol.co.za. 
45  The Presidency 2012 www.info.gov.za. 
46  Legalbrief Today 14 February 2012 legalbrief@legalbrief.co.za. 
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review the powers of the Constitutional Court lacked appreciation of the 'basic tenets 
underlying the doctrine of the separation of powers'.47  
 
On 28 February 2012, despite all the concerns that had been expressed, it became 
clear that the South African government wished to give practical content to the 
proposed 'assessment' of the decisions of the Constitutional Court - when the 
Minister of Justice, Jeff Radebe, announced that the government would commission 
a study of the manner in which Constitutional Court rulings had impacted on the law, 
the state and the lives of citizens.48 The Minister stated that the project was not 
aimed at curtailing the powers of the court, but formed part of overall efforts to 
transform the judiciary.49  
 
This, then, is the state-of-play in South Africa at the time of writing this article. 
Clashes between the executive and judiciary over the question of the separation of 
powers are certainly not new. As pointed out by George Bizos in his article 
discussed above, there are some interesting examples of such clashes to be found 
in South Africa's legal history. In a search for further instructive examples, however, 
we wish to cast our net wider than the shores of this country and go back much 
further in legal history than the examples cited by Bizos. We turn now to an 
examination of a clash between the executive and judiciary which took place over 
400 years ago in England, at a time when the doctrine of the separation of powers in 
its modern form was still in its infancy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47  Rabkin 2012 www.businessday.co.za. 
48  Ferreira 2012 mg.co.za. 
49  The statement read, inter alia, as follows: 'We have alluded to the fact that the kind of 
assessment we set to embark upon is not unusual. It occurs all the time and as research will 
show, universities undertake this form of research to evaluate the social-rights jurisprudence on 
the lives of peoples … [T]he assessment should not be seen in isolation but as part of a holistic 
approach to the transformation of the judicial system in line with the values of the Constitution. 
These recommendations, including the assessment of the decisions of the Constitutional Court, 
are with a view to developing clear and concise recommendations that are necessary to unlock 
challenges that have the potential to undermine the transformation goals that are intended to 
nourish our constitutional democracy.' (Radebe 2012 www.justice.gov.za). 
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4  Lessons from English history – The clash between King James I of 
England and Chief Justice Edward Coke  
 
One of the earliest examples of a clash between the executive and the judiciary on 
the question of the separation of powers took place in the 17th century between King 
James I of England and his Chief Justice, Edward Coke. There are a number of 
reasons for why we believe this particular clash is significant. Firstly, the fact that this 
clash took place over 400 years ago in England shows that the current tensions 
between the executive and judiciary in South Africa are by no means novel. 
Secondly, the example chosen illustrates that clashes of this nature are particularly 
likely to take place during the early years of a young democracy, when there is still 
contestation as to the basic ground rules around which that democracy is being 
formed.50 Thirdly, it is submitted that the clash between James and Coke took place 
at a particularly significant time, when the modern doctrine of separation of powers 
was in the process of formation. Fourthly, the example chosen illustrates the dire 
consequences which may result from such clashes. After all, contestation over 
issues involving the separation of powers eventually led to a brutal civil war in 
England, resulting in the destruction of the executive and its replacement with what 
amounted to a military dictatorship. This may serve as a warning to South Africans 
today. 
 
It is useful to begin with a brief overview of the period during which the clash 
between James and Coke took place. The 17th century in England was profoundly 
significant in the development of constitutional democracy. It has been called 
England's 'Century of Revolution', and was to witness protracted and widespread 
civil and political conflict epitomised by the vicious civil war of 1641 to 1651; the 
beheading of King Charles I and the victory of parliament; the 'Commonwealth' of 
Oliver Cromwell; the restoration of the monarchy; the final demise of the notion of 
absolutism following the so-called 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688; and the confirmation 
of parliament's gains entrenched in the 'Bill of Rights' of 1689. The clash between 
                                                          
50  It is submitted that the contestation in 17
th
 century England between the doctrine of the 'divine 
right of kings' on the one hand and the 'social contract' on the other may serve to shed light on 
the contestation between 'majoritarian' and 'liberal' (or 'constitutional') conceptions of democracy 
in South Africa today. 
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King James I on the one hand and the judiciary on the other took place during the 
early part of this century of revolution.  
 
James I was the first of the 'Stuart' kings, who came to power in 1602 upon the death 
of the last of the Tudor monarchs, Elizabeth I, who had died childless.51 By this stage 
in England's political and legal development political power did not lie solely in the 
hands of the monarchy but was divided, not entirely precisely, between the king, 
parliament, and the judiciary. Parliament, particularly the elected House of 
Commons, was the prime source of statutory law.52 It was an entrenched institution, 
having no real equivalent in continental Europe.53 The courts were in a somewhat 
more ambiguous position. The monarch was not directly involved in the conduct of 
judicial matters, particularly those involving the common law. While two of the three 
'common law' courts (the 'King's Bench' and the 'Court of Common Pleas') 
functioned almost entirely as judicial forums, the other 'common law' court (the 
'Exchequer'), as well as many other English courts at the time, had administrative as 
well as judicial functions. In some cases the administrative functions of courts 
exceeded their judicial functions, the most obvious example being the Exchequer. 
Conversely, executive institutions such as the Chancery and Admiralty had judicial 
functions in addition to their administrative functions.54 As far as judges were 
concerned, the administrative duties of many of the judicial officials involved certain 
members of the judiciary acting as officials of the executive, with the concomitant 
                                                          
51  The Stuarts were a Scottish dynasty. The last Tudor monarch was Elizabeth I, who died 
childless. Her cousin was Mary Queen of Scots, who had a son, James. He was James VI of 
Scotland, but was invited by parliament to become James I of England in 1602. From this time on 
the two realms were ruled jointly, with formal union between the two countries being instituted 
about a century later in 1707. Schama History of Britain 395. See also 'the Acts of Union': the 
Union with Scotland Act 1706 passed by the English parliament, and the Union with England Act 
1707 passed by the Scottish parliament. 
52  Parliament itself began as a 'great council' of all the leading churchmen and aristocracy in order 
to fulfil the requirement in articles 12 and 14 of Magna Carta, that the monarch could not raise 
any taxes without the 'consent of the realm'. This body, which became the House of Lords, was 
supplemented in 1265 by the institution introduced by Simon de Montfort, which was intended to 
represent the 'commons' or more accurately, the 'communities' of England. This became the 
House of Commons. With a qualified franchise it tended to be elected by the lower orders of the 
nobility, in other words the gentry, as well as the wealthy merchant class. See Prosser and Sharp 
Short Constitutional History 66-80. 
53  For instance, the States General in France bore no real resemblance, neither did it have anything 
approaching comparable authority. See Britannica Date Unknown www.britannica.com. 
54  This could result in officials being in a position of what would today be considered an 
unacceptable conflict of interest. For example, the Admiralty adjudicated over prizes and piracy 
confiscations, from which officials profited. According to Jones, this amounted to a 'private 
concern making a profit out of the public'. See Jones Politics and the Bench 17. 
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dangers of executive-mindedness in the performance of their judicial function. 
Indeed, judges were appointed by the king as royal officials, with only Magna Carta 
as a safeguard to ensure that suitable persons were appointed.55 The law tended to 
be interpreted in line with the political beliefs of the judges, which might explain why 
certain judges showed remarkable independence, while others were inclined to side 
with the executive.56 As tensions rose in the period immediately preceding the Civil 
War, for example, several judges were indicted by parliament, since they had been 
drawn into its conflict with the crown.57 It is clear, therefore, that the separation of 
powers in seventeenth century England was somewhat different from the position in 
most constitutional democracies today.  
 
In general terms, it is fair to say that whereas the Tudor monarchs had been 
successful in exercising authority in such a way as to maintain some sort of balance 
between the different centres of power (or at least to maintain the appearance of 
such a balance while manipulating matters in such a way as to achieve their ends), 
the same was not true of the Stuart kings.58 The Stuarts were not nearly as subtle as 
the Tudors in dealing with parliament, and at various junctures the courts were 
drawn into ongoing disputes between these two centres of power. In part, however, 
the continuing conflict was due to factors which were beyond the control of the 
Stuarts. Social, political and economic conditions had changed since Tudor times. 
Spanish gold from the New World had caused economic inflation in Europe, which in 
turn resulted in a growing fiscal crisis in England. The Stuart monarchy was not free 
to deal with this issue as it wished, since the power to levy taxes did not lie within the 
hands of the monarchy but in the hands of parliament. Indeed, the original reason for 
parliament's existence and the main source of parliamentary power was control over 
                                                          
55  Magna Carta article 45: 'We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs only such as 
know the law of the realm and mean to observe it well'. See also Jones Politics and the Bench 
147. 
56  It is also clear that the judges tended to adhere to precedent. Persons aggrieved by a decision 
would frequently overlook this, however, and instead of declaring a law to be wrong, would blame 
the judge supervising the law unjustly, for adopting a political stance. See Jones Politics and the 
Bench 1.  
57  Jones Politics and the Bench 137-143.  
58  The Tudor success in ensuring the cooperation of parliament was achieved partially by their 
acquisition of support from the gentry in the Commons, which they used against the power of the 
great Lords. Fundamentally, however, the Tudors were obliged to work with parliament, even 
though they were adept at having their way. Parliament had its area of authority enlarged, whilst 
the Tudors avoided using the royal prerogative in such a manner as to cause a clash. See Keir 
Constitutional History 151-154; Prosser and Sharp Short Constitutional History 107-109.  
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law providing for taxation.59 The frustration that must have been felt by the Stuart 
monarchs is mirrored, perhaps, in the growing frustration felt by the current South 
African executive leadership.  
 
The Stuarts were also the authors of their own eventual downfall. One element which 
led to their demise was the Stuarts' adherence to the doctrine of the 'Divine Right of 
Kings', which did not enjoy universal acceptance in England at the time.60 The 
Stuarts' preoccupation with the doctrine placed them on a political collision course 
with parliament. This was to lead to ongoing crises, complicated by religious 
differences - eventually resulting in civil war between king and parliament.61 It is clear 
that James I, in particular, was a firm believer in the doctrine of the 'Divine Right of 
Kings'. This is evidenced by his authorship in 1598 of a paper entitled 'The Trew Law 
of Free Monarchies; or, The Reciprocal and Mutual Duty Betwixt a Free King and His 
Natural Subjects'.62 The attitude of James I toward his duties, the duties of his 
subjects, the role of the courts, and the legislature is indicated both expressly and 
implicitly in this paper. He commences by arguing that there is biblical authority for 
                                                          
59  Winston Churchill states as follows: 'Who was to have the last word in the matter of taxation? 
Hitherto everyone had accepted the medieval doctrine that "The King may not rule his people by 
other laws than they assent unto, and therefore he may set upon them no imposition [i.e. tax] 
without their assent." But no one had analysed it, or traced out its implications in any detail. If this 
were the fundamental law of England, did it come from the mists of antiquity or from the 
indulgence of former kings? Was it the inalienable birth-right of Englishmen, or a concession 
which might be revoked? Was the King beneath the law or was he not? And who was to say 
what that law was? The greater part of the seventeenth century was to be spent in trying to find 
answers, historical, legal theoretical, and practical, to such questions.' (Churchill History of the 
English-speaking Peoples 2; Jones Politics and the Bench 30). 
60  This was probably due to the existence of parliament, despite the fact that the servile parliaments 
of the Tudor period may have given the impression that the doctrine was alive and well. Although 
many kinds of pre-modern forms of monarchy involved some aspect of divine blessing, feudal 
kingship did not involve the concept of the divine right in the fashion that was to develop in 
Europe during the Reformation. The 'divine right of kings', as a doctrine, arose due to several 
factors. These included the decline in the power of the nobility and the centralisation of state 
authority, the rediscovery and investigation of Roman concepts of imperial semi-divine authority 
during the Renaissance, and a Protestant preoccupation with reducing the power of the Catholic 
Church. See Prosser and Sharp Short Constitutional History 108-109.  
61  Society in Britain at this time was predominantly Protestant, with the practice of Catholicism 
outlawed in England, Wales and Scotland. See Schama History of Britain 329. 
62  This was written when James was still only king of Scotland, and before he acceded to the 
throne of England. However, he reissued the 'Trew Law' upon his becoming king of England in 
1603. James continued to 'stick to his guns' and republished 'Trew Law' in 1616, together with 
other works he had written, including poetry and political theory. As might be clear from his 
publication of this and other works, apart from any political philosophies or office, James had 
pretentions at scholarship. The most memorable piece of scholarship to bear James' name was 
commissioned rather than written by him, however - namely the 'Authorised' or King James 
version of the Bible of 1611. This remains the most influential version of the Bible ever to be 
written in English, and is one of the foremost works of English literature. See, generally Bragg 
Book of Books. 
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royal absolutism, and then deals with the consequences of this divine mandate in 
these terms: 63 
 
Shortly then, to take up in two or three sentences grounded upon all these 
arguments, out of the law of God, the duty and allegiance of the people unto their 
lawful king, their obedience, I say, ought to be to him as to God's lieutenant in earth, 
obeying his commands in all things except directly against God as the commands of 
God's minister, acknowledging him a judge set by God over them, having power to 
judge them but to be judged only by God, to whom only he must give count of his 
judgment, fearing him as their judge, loving him as their father, praying for him as 
their protector, for his continuance, if he be good, for his amendment, if he be 
wicked, following and obeying his lawful commands, eschewing and flying his fury 
in his unlawful, without resistance but by sobs and tears to God. 
 
This passage provides prima facie indication of James' attitude to the courts, which, 
to follow his reasoning, ought to feature only as extensions of James' personal divine 
mandate, using authority delegated from James to deal with matters to which he did 
not have the opportunity to attend.64 However, James' firm belief in the divine right of 
kings did not fit well in 17th century England. For example, on travelling towards 
London in 1602, having newly become King of England, James is said to have 
ordered the summary execution of a pickpocket. This order was not complied with 
since the offender was entitled to a trial before an English court.65 
 
It was probably inevitable that James would eventually clash with the English courts. 
The clash, when it came, was part of a process which was to lead, eventually, to the 
English Civil War. This illustrates the potential dangers of such contestations over 
the separation of powers, which weaken the constitutional norms underpinning 
democracy. The English Civil War, of course, was to lead to the eventual execution 
of James I's successor, Charles I - for treason against 'the present Parliament, and 
the people therein represented'.66 Anyone brought up to believe in the ideas 
                                                          
63  The spelling in this passage has been modernised to facilitate ease of reading, and has been 
sourced from The Norton Anthology of English Literature – Norton Topics Online Date Unknown 
www.wwnorton.com. A fuller version featuring the original spelling may be found at Perseus 
Digital Library Date Unknown  www.perseus.tufts.edu. 
64  '... acknowledging him a judge set by God over them, having power to judge them but to be 
judged only by God, to whom only he must give count of his judgment, fearing him as their judge 
...' 
65  Churchill History of the English-speaking Peoples 1. 
66  Excerpts from "The Charge against the King": "That the said Charles Stuart, being admitted King 
of England, and therein trusted with a limited power to govern by and according to the laws of the 
land, and not otherwise; and by his trust, oath, and office, being obliged to use the power 
committed to him for the good and benefit of the people, and for the preservation of their rights 
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expressed in 'Trew Laws' would struggle with the concept that treason could be 
committed against anyone other than the monarch.67 The present South African 
executive seems to be struggling with the idea that the power conferred upon it by 
the electorate can be limited by an unelected judiciary which acts in terms of a 
constitution as the final source of authority. Of course, this view is predicated upon a 
simple 'majoritarian' as opposed to a 'liberal' (or 'constitutional') concept of 
democracy.68 This will be discussed in greater detail in Part Two of this article. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Part One of this article has traced two examples of a clash between the executive 
and the judiciary in a developing democracy. Although far removed from each other 
in space and time, a constitutional and legal dialogue may be said to exist between 
17th century England and present-day South Africa. In each case, the executive and 
judiciary seem to be in fundamental disagreement over the source of political 
authority and legitimacy. In the case of seventeenth century England, it was the 
doctrine of 'the divine right of kings' versus that of the 'social contract', whereas in 
the case of present-day South Africa it is 'majoritarian' versus a 'liberal' (or 
'constitutional') conception of democracy. Fundamental disagreements of this kind 
inevitably result in tension and instability. Compromise on such foundational issues 
is often impossible. The conflict must be resolved in favour of one side or the other, 
with profound implications for the society in question. This, at least, is the lesson of 
history.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and liberties; yet, nevertheless, out of a wicked design to erect and uphold in himself an unlimited 
and tyrannical power to rule according to his will, and to overthrow the rights and liberties of the 
people, yea, to take away and make void the foundations thereof, and of all redress and remedy 
of misgovernment, which by the fundamental constitutions of this kingdom were reserved on the 
people's behalf in the right and power of frequent and successive Parliaments … [H]e, the said 
Charles Stuart, for accomplishment of such his designs, and for the protecting of himself and his 
adherents in his and their wicked practices, to the same ends hath traitorously and maliciously 
levied war against the present Parliament, and the people therein represented ...' See Gardiner 
Constitutional Documents. 
67  By contrast, across the channel, Louis IV of France had begun his long reign and was to 
consolidate absolute monarchical rule in France - which persisted until the French Revolution. In 
England, however, the 'Restoration of the Monarchy' in 1660, together with the 'Glorious 
Revolution' of 1688, was to see the consolidation of a constitutional monarchy. 
68  There is, of course, much historical precedent for this clash of ideas, including for example the 
competing notions of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the nature of the social 
contract.  
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In Part Two of this article the clash between James and Coke in 17th-century 
England will be examined in greater detail. Possible lessons will be drawn for 21st 
century South Africa. In particular, the arguments of Ronald Dworkin against 
majoritarian conceptions of democracy will be discussed and applied to the current 
dispute between the South African executive and the judiciary. 
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